Thirty years ago, Jordan’s King Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin spent hours leaning over a map, painstakingly defining their nations’ border. This key agreement, achieved after months of US-mediated negotiations, culminated in a peace deal signed on October 26, 1994, in Wadi Araba. It marked the second, and still the most recent, peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state, grounded largely in the friendship that developed between the two leaders.
However, the envisioned “warm peace” was short-lived. A year after the treaty, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli opposed to the peace process. With the election of hardline Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, peace efforts faced new obstacles, as Israeli settlement expansions and restrictions on Palestinians intensified. Mustafa Hamarneh, a former confidant of King Hussein and now a Jordanian senator, describes this period as the beginning of the “regression in the peace process.”
While Jordan’s government maintains ties with Israel, public sentiment remains cold, hindered by Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians. Jordan has fiercely criticized Israel’s current actions in Gaza, halting public communication while keeping security channels open. Economic links continue, with border industrial zones benefiting from US tariff exemptions and contributing to Jordan’s exports. However, authorities have recently clamped down on anti-Israel protests as support for Hamas has emerged within these demonstrations.
The 1994 peace treaty committed each country to safeguarding the other’s security, provided Jordan with much-needed water from Israel, and offered debt relief essential for Jordan’s economy. Israel also recognized Jordan’s custodianship over Muslim shrines in Jerusalem, reinforcing the Hashemite monarchy’s historical role.
Yet, tensions resurfaced with Netanyahu’s return to power in 2022. His administration’s support for increased access by religious ultranationalists to the Al Aqsa Mosque has strained Jordanian-Israeli relations further. Though King Hussein, who passed away in 1999, called the treaty “honorable and balanced,” both he and Rabin took significant political risks in reaching it, often facing opposition domestically.
The secret 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians provided King Hussein with a timely advantage, helping him formalize peace with Israel. Yet, he was disheartened that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had pursued talks independently and settled for limited gains. King Hussein believed a coordinated effort might have led to a stronger outcome.
The ongoing Gaza conflict has reignited Jordan’s security concerns, with the threat of a new refugee influx. Jordan has witnessed an increase in cross-border infiltration attempts, mostly thwarted, yet symbolic of rising unrest.
In Amman, a recent protest commemorating Jordanians killed in a cross-border attempt sparked Prime Minister Jafar Hassan’s warning against destabilizing Jordan. Despite occasional rhetoric, officials suggest that ending the treaty is not on the table. But as tensions rise, Marwan Muasher, Jordan’s first ambassador to Israel, doubts economic and security cooperation with Israel will remain unaffected.
Many in Israel now believe that a return to the pre-conflict status quo under Netanyahu is impossible. Former Israeli diplomat Nimrod Novik asserts that Netanyahu’s leadership has strained relations domestically and internationally. Until there is a change in leadership, he argues, the region remains on a “dangerous trajectory” with escalating instability across Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank.
As Jordan and Israel mark three decades of their peace treaty, the relationship’s future remains uncertain. The persistence of mutual cooperation, albeit limited, shows that both countries recognize the benefits of maintaining peaceful relations, especially in a region prone to conflict. However, without a breakthrough on the Palestinian issue and a broader regional alignment, their relationship will likely remain characterized by pragmatic coexistence rather than genuine peace.
In the absence of war, Jordan and Israel are not entirely at peace – but they continue to exist in a delicate equilibrium, bound by the terms of a treaty yet held back by longstanding grievances and unresolved regional challenges. As the world observes the anniversary of their treaty, Jordan and Israel’s relationship remains a cautionary tale of what happens when peace is not built on the full engagement of society, but rather held together by the barest threads of diplomacy.
